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<h1><a name="adv_config">Other configuration possibilities</a></h1>
<p>This document describes various options for FreeS/WAN configuration which
are less used or more complex (often both) than the standard cases described
in our <a href="config.html#config">config</a> and
<a href="quickstart.html#quick_guide">quickstart</a> documents.</p>
<h2><a name="thumb">Some rules of thumb about configuration</a></h2>
<h3><a name="cheap.tunnel">Tunnels are cheap</a></h3>
<p>Nearly all of the overhead in IPsec processing is in the encryption and
authentication of packets. Our <a href="performance.html">performance</a>
document discusses these overheads.</p>
<p>Beside those overheads, the cost of managing additional tunnels is
trivial. Whether your gateway supports one tunnel or ten just does not
matter. A hundred might be a problem; there is a <a
href="performance.html#biggate">section</a> on this in the performance
document.</p>
<p>So, in nearly all cases, if using multiple tunnels gives you a reasonable
way to describe what you need to do, you should describe it that way in your
configuration files.</p>
<p>For example, one user recently asked on a mailing list about this network
configuration:</p>
<pre> netA---gwA---gwB---netB
|----netC
netA and B are secured netC not.
netA and gwA can not access netC</pre>
<p>The user had constructed only one tunnel, netA to netB, and wanted to know
how to use ip-route to get netC packets into it. This is entirely
unnecessary. One of the replies was:</p>
<pre> The simplest way and indeed the right way to
solve this problem is to set up two connections:
leftsubnet=NetA
left=gwA
right=gwB
rightsubnet=NetB
and
leftsubnet=NetA
left=gwA
right=gwB
rightsubnet=NetC</pre>
<p>This would still be correct even if we added nets D, E, F,
... to the above diagram and needed twenty tunnels.</p>
<p>Of course another possibility would be to just use one tunnel, with a
subnet mask that includes both netB and netC (or B, C, D, ...). See next
section.</p>
<p>In general, you can construct as many tunnels as you need. Networks like
netC in this example that do not connect directly to the gateway are fine, as
long as the gateway can route to them.</p>
<p>The number of tunnels can become an issue if it reaches 50 or so. This is
discussed in the <a href="performance.html#biggate">performance</a> document.
Look there for information on supporting hundreds of Road Warriors from one
gateway.</p>
<p>If you find yourself with too many tunnels for some reason like having
eight subnets at one location and nine at another so you end up with
9*8=72 tunnels, read the next section here.</p>
<h3><a name="subnet.size">Subnet sizes</a></h3>
<p>The subnets used in <var>leftsubnet</var> and <var>rightsubnet</var> can
be of any size that fits your needs, and they need not correspond to physical
networks.</p>
<p>You adjust the size by changing the <a href="glossary.html#subnet">subnet
mask</a>, the number after the slash in the subnet description. For
example</p>
<ul>
<li>in 192.168.100.0/24 the /24 mask says 24 bits are used to designate the
network. This leave 8 bits to label machines. This subnet has 256
addresses. .0 and .255 are reserved, so it can have 254 machines.</li>
<li>A subnet with a /23 mask would be twice as large, 512 addresses.</li>
<li>A subnet with a /25 mask would be half the size, 128 addresses.</li>
<li>/0 is the whole Internet</li>
<li>/32 is a single machine</li>
</ul>
<p>As an example of using these in connection descriptions, suppose your
company's head office has four physical networks using the address ranges:</p>
<dl>
<dt>192.168.100.0/24</dt>
<dd>development</dd>
<dt>192.168.101.0/24</dt>
<dd>production</dd>
<dt>192.168.102.0/24</dt>
<dd>marketing</dd>
<dt>192.168.103.0/24</dt>
<dd>administration</dd>
</dl>
<p>You can use exactly those subnets in your connection descriptions, or use
larger subnets to grant broad access if required:</p>
<dl>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24</dt>
<dd>remote hosts can access only development</dd>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/23</dt>
<dd>remote hosts can access development or production</dd>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.102.0/23</dt>
<dd>remote hosts can access marketing or administration</dd>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/22</dt>
<dd>remote hosts can access any of the four departments</dd>
</dl>
<p>or use smaller subnets to restrict access:</p>
<dl>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.103.0/24</dt>
<dd>remote hosts can access any machine in administration</dd>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.103.64/28</dt>
<dd>remote hosts can access only certain machines in administration.</dd>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.103.42/32</dt>
<dd>remote hosts can access only one particular machine in
administration</dd>
</dl>
<p>To be exact, 192.68.103.64/28 means all addresses whose top 28 bits match
192.168.103.64. There are 16 of these because there are 16 possibilities for
the remainingg 4 bits. Their addresses are 192.168.103.64 to
192.168.103.79.</p>
<p>Each connection description can use a different subnet if required.</p>
<p>It is possible to use all the examples above on the same FreeS/WAN
gateway, each in a different connection description, perhaps for different
classes of user or for different remote offices.</p>
<p>It is also possible to have multiple tunnels using different
<var>leftsubnet</var> descriptions with the same <var>right</var>. For
example, when the marketing manager is on the road he or she might have
access to:</p>
<dl>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.102.0/24</dt>
<dd>all machines in marketing</dd>
<dt>192.168.101.32/29</dt>
<dd>some machines in production</dd>
<dt>leftsubnet=192.168.103.42/32</dt>
<dd>one particular machine in administration</dd>
</dl>
<p>This takes three tunnels, but tunnels are cheap. If the laptop is set up
to build all three tunnels automatically, then he or she can access all these
machines concurrently, perhaps from different windows.</p>
<h3><a name="example.more">Other network layouts</a></h3>
<p>Here is the usual network picture for a site-to-site VPN::</p>
<pre> Sunset==========West------------------East=========Sunrise
local net untrusted net local net</pre>
<p>and for the Road Warrior::</p>
<pre> telecommuter's PC or
traveller's laptop
Sunset==========West------------------East
corporate LAN untrusted net</pre>
<p>Other configurations are also possible.</p>
<h4><a name="internet.subnet">The Internet as a big subnet</a></h4>
<p>A telecommuter might have:</p>
<pre> Sunset==========West------------------East ================= firewall --- the Internet
home network untrusted net corporate network</pre>
<p>This can be described as a special case of the general subnet-to-subnet
connection. The subnet on the right is 0.0.0.0/0, the whole Internet.</p>
<p>West (the home gateway) can have its firewall rules set up so that only
IPsec packets to East are allowed out. It will then behave as if its only
connection to the world was a wire to East.</p>
<p>When machines on the home network need to reach the Internet, they do so
via the tunnel, East and the corporate firewall. From the viewpoint of the
Internet (perhaps of some EvilDoer trying to break in!), those home office
machines are behind the firewall and protected by it.</p>
<h4><a name="wireless.config">Wireless</a></h4>
<p>Another possible configuration comes up when you do not trust the local
network, either because you have very high security standards or because your
are using easily-intercepted wireless signals.</p>
<p>Some wireless networks have built-in encryption called <a
href="glossary.html#WEP">WEP</a>, but its security is dubious. It is a fairly
common practice to use IPsec instead.</p>
<p>In this case, part of your network may look like this:</p>
<pre> West-----------------------------East == the rest of your network
workstation untrusted wireless net</pre>
<p>Of course, there would likely be several wireless workstations, each with
its own IPsec tunnel to the East gateway.</p>
<p>The connection descriptions look much like Road Warrior descriptions:</p>
<ul>
<li>each workstation should have its own unique
<ul>
<li>identifier for IPsec</li>
<li>RSA key</li>
<li>connection description.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>on the gateway, use <var>left=%any</var>, or the workstation IP
address</li>
<li>on workstations, <var>left=%defaultroute</var>, or the workstation IP
address</li>
<li><var>leftsubnet=</var> is not used.</li>
</ul>
<p>The <var>rightsubnet=</var> parameter might be set in any of several
ways:</p>
<dl>
<dt>rightsubnet=0.0.0.0/0</dt>
<dd>allowing workstations to access the entire Internet (see <a
href="#internet.subnet">above</a>)</dd>
<dt>rightsubnet=a.b.c.0/24</dt>
<dd>allowing access to your entire local network</dd>
<dt>rightsubnet=a.b.c.d/32</dt>
<dd>restricting the workstation to connecting to a particular server</dd>
</dl>
<p>Of course you can mix and match these as required. For example, a
university might allow faculty full Internet access while letting student
laptops connect only to a group of lab machines.</p>
<h2><a name="choose">Choosing connection types</a></h2>
<p>One choice you need to make before configuring additional connections is
what type or types of connections you will use. There are several options,
and you can use more than one concurrently.</p>
<h3><a name="man-auto">Manual vs. automatic keying</a></h3>
<p>IPsec allows two types of connections, with manual or automatic keying.
FreeS/WAN starts them with commands such as:</p>
<pre> ipsec manual --up <var>name</var>
ipsec auto --up <var>name</var></pre>
<p>The difference is in how they are keyed.</p>
<dl>
<dt><a href="glossary.html#manual">Manually keyed</a> connections</dt>
<dd>use keys stored in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</a>.</dd>
<dt><a href="glossary.html#auto">Automatically keyed</a> connections</dt>
<dd>use keys automatically generated by the Pluto key negotiation daemon.
The key negotiation protocol, <a href="glossary.html#IKE">IKE</a>, must
authenticate the other system. (It is vulnerable to a <a
href="glossary.html#middle">man-in-the-middle attack</a> if used
without authentication.) We currently support two authentication
methods:
<ul>
<li>using shared secrets stored in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</a>.</li>
<li>RSA <a href="glossary.html#public">public key</a> authentication,
with our machine's private key in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</a>. Public
keys for other machines may either be placed in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</a> or provided via
DNS.</li>
</ul>
<p>A third method, using RSA keys embedded in <a
href="glossary.html#X509">X.509</a> certtificates, is provided by
user <a href="web.html#patch">patches</a>.</p>
</dd>
</dl>
<p><a href="glossary.html#manual">Manually keyed</a> connections provide
weaker security than <a href="glossary.html#auto">automatically keyed</a>
connections. An opponent who reads ipsec.secrets(5) gets your encryption key
and can read all data encrypted by it. If he or she has an archive of old
messages, all of them back to your last key change are also readable.</p>
<p>With automatically-(re)-keyed connections, an opponent who reads
ipsec.secrets(5) gets the key used to authenticate your system in IKE -- the
shared secret or your private key, depending what authentication mechanism is
in use. However, he or she does not automatically gain access to any
encryption keys or any data.</p>
<p>An attacker who has your authentication key can mount a <a
href="glossary.html#middle">man-in-the-middle attack</a> and, if that
succeeds, he or she will get encryption keys and data. This is a serious
danger, but it is better than having the attacker read everyting as soon as
he or she breaks into ipsec.secrets(5).. Moreover, the keys change often so
an opponent who gets one key does not get a large amount of data. To read all
your data, he or she would have to do a man-in-the-middle attack at every key
change.</p>
<p>We discuss using <a href="#prodman">manual keying in production</a> below,
but this is <strong>not recommended</strong> except in special circumstances,
such as needing to communicate with some implementation that offers no
auto-keyed mode compatible with FreeS/WAN.</p>
<p>Manual keying may also be useful for testing. There is some discussion of
this in our <a href="faq.html#man4debug">FAQ</a>.</p>
<h3><a name="auto-auth">Authentication methods for auto-keying</a></h3>
<p>The IKE protocol which Pluto uses to negotiate connections between
gateways must use some form of authentication of peers. A gateway must know
who it is talking to before it can create a secure connection. We support two
basic methods for this authentication:</p>
<ul>
<li>shared secrets, stored in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets(5)</a></li>
<li>RSA authentication</li>
</ul>
<p>There are, howver, several variations on the RSA theme, using different
methods of managing the RSA keys:</p>
<ul>
<li>our RSA private key in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets(5)</a> with other
gateways' public keys
<dl>
<dt>either</dt>
<dd>stored in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</a></dd>
<dt>or</dt>
<dd>looked up via <a href="glossary.html#DNS">DNS</a></dd>
</dl>
</li>
<li>authentication with <a href="glossary.html#x509">x.509</a>
certificates.; See our <a href="web.html#patch">links section</a> for
information on user-contributed patches for this.:</li>
</ul>
<p>Public keys in <a href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5</a>)
give a reasonably straightforward method of specifying keys for explicitly
configured connections.</p>
<p>Putting public keys in DNS allows us to support <a
href="glossary.html#carpediem">opportunistic encryption</a>. Any two
FreeS/WAN gateways can provide secure communication, without either of them
having any preset information about the other.</p>
<p>X.509 certificates may be required to interface to various <a
href="glossary.html#PKI">PKI</a>s.</p>
<h3><a name="adv-pk">Advantages of public key methods</a></h3>
<p>Authentication with a <a href="glossary.html#public">public key</a> method
such as <a href="glossary.html#RSA">RSA</a> has some important advantages
over using shared secrets.</p>
<ul>
<li>no problem of secure transmission of secrets
<ul>
<li>A shared secret must be shared, so you have the problem of
transmitting it securely to the other party. If you get this wrong,
you have no security.</li>
<li>With a public key technique, you transmit only your public key. The
system is designed to ensure that it does not matter if an enemy
obtains public keys. The private key never leaves your machine.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>easier management
<ul>
<li>Suppose you have 20 branch offices all connecting to one gateway at
head office, and all using shared secrets. Then the head office admin
has 20 secrets to manage. Each of them must be kept secret not only
from outsiders, but also from 19 of the branch office admins. The
branch office admins have only one secret each to manage.
<p>If the branch offices need to talk to each other, this becomes
problematic. You need another 20*19/2 = 190 secrets for
branch-to-branch communication, each known to exactly two branches.
Now all the branch admins have the headache of handling 20 keys, each
shared with exactly one other branch or with head office.</p>
<p>For larger numbers of branches, the number of connections and
secrets increases quadratically and managing them becomes a
nightmare. A 1000-gateway fully connected network needs 499,500
secrets, each known to exactly two players. There are ways to reduce
this problem, for example by introducing a central key server, but
these involve additional communication overheads, more administrative
work, and new threats that must be carefully guarded against.</p>
</li>
<li>With public key techniques, the <em>only</em> thing you have to
keep secret is your private key, and <em>you keep that secret from
everyone</em>.
<p>As network size increaes, the number of public keys used increases
linearly with the number of nodes. This still requires careful
administration in large applications, but is nothing like the
disaster of a quadratic increase. On a 1000-gateway network, you have
1000 private keys, each of which must be kept secure on one machine,
and 1000 public keys which must be distributed. This is not a trivial
problem, but it is manageable.</p>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>does not require fixed IP addresses
<ul>
<li>When shared secrets are used in IPsec, the responder must be able
to tell which secret to use by looking at the IP address on the
incoming packets. When the other parties do not have a fixed IP
address to be identified by (for example, on nearly all dialup ISP
connections and many cable or ADSL links), this does not work well --
all must share the same secret!</li>
<li>When RSA authentication is in use, the initiator can identify
itself by name before the key must be determined. The responder then
checks that the message is signed with the public key corresponding
to that name.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>There is also a disadvantage:</p>
<ul>
<li>your private key is a single point of attack, extremely valuable to an
enemy
<ul>
<li>with shared secrets, an attacker who steals your ipsec.secrets file
can impersonate you or try <a
href="glossary.html#middle">man-in-the-middle</a> attacks, but can
only attack connections described in that file</li>
<li>an attacker who steals your private key gains the chance to attack
not only existing connections <em>but also any future
connections</em> created using that key</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>This is partly counterbalanced by the fact that the key is never
transmitted and remains under your control at all times. It is likely
necessary, however, to take account of this in setting security policy. For
example, you should change gateway keys when an administrator leaves the
company, and should change them periodically in any case.</p>
<p>Overall, public key methods are <strong>more secure, more easily managed
and more flexible</strong>. We recommend that they be used for all
connections, unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise.</p>
<h2><a name="prodsecrets">Using shared secrets in production</a></h2>
<p>Generally, public key methods are preferred for reasons given above, but
shared secrets can be used with no loss of security, just more work and
perhaps more need to take precautions.</p>
<p>What I call "shared secrets" are sometimes also called "pre-shared keys".
They are used only for for authentication, never for encryption. Calling them
"pre-shared keys" has confused some users into thinking they were encryption
keys, so I prefer to avoid the term..</p>
<p>If you are interoperating with another IPsec implementation, you may find
its documentation calling them "passphrases".</p>
<h3><a name="secrets">Putting secrets in ipsec.secrets(5)</a></h3>
<p>If shared secrets are to be used to <a
href="glossary.html#authentication">authenticate</a> communication for the <a
href="glossary.html#DH">Diffie-Hellman</a> key exchange in the <a
href="glossary.html#IKE">IKE</a> protocol, then those secrets must be stored
in <var>/etc/ipsec.secrets</var>. For details, see the <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets(5)</a> man page.</p>
<p>A few considerations are vital:</p>
<ul>
<li>make the secrets long and unguessable. Since they need not be
remembered by humans, very long ugly strings may be used. We suggest
using our <a href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html">ipsec_ranbits(8)</a>
utility to generate long (128 bits or more) random strings.</li>
<li>transmit secrets securely. You have to share them with other systems,
but you lose if they are intercepted and used against you. Use <a
href="glossary.html#PGP">PGP</a>, <a href="glossary.html#SSH">SSH</a>,
hand delivery of a floppy disk which is then destroyed, or some other
trustworthy method to deliver them.</li>
<li>store secrets securely, in root-owned files with permissions
rw------.</li>
<li>limit sharing of secrets. Alice, Bob, Carol and Dave may all talk to
each other, but only Alice and Bob should know the secret for an
Alice-Bob link.</li>
<li><strong>do not share private keys</strong>. The private key for RSA
authentication of your system is stored in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets(5)</a>, but it is a
different class of secret from the pre-shared keys used for the "shared
secret" authentication. No-one but you should have the RSA private
key.</li>
</ul>
<p>Each line has the IP addresses of the two gateways plus the secret. It
should look something like this:</p>
<pre> 10.0.0.1 11.0.0.1 : PSK "jxTR1lnmSjuj33n4W51uW3kTR55luUmSmnlRUuWnkjRj3UuTV4T3USSu23Uk55nWu5TkTUnjT"</pre>
<p><var>PSK</var> indicates the use of a
<strong>p</strong>re-<strong>s</strong>hared <strong>k</strong>ey. The quotes
and the whitespace shown are required.</p>
<p>You can use any character string as your secret. For security, it should
be both long and extremely hard to guess. We provide a utility to generate
such strings, <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html">ipsec_ranbits(8)</a>.</p>
<p>You want the same secret on the two gateways used, so you create a line
with that secret and the two gateway IP addresses. The installation process
supplies an example secret, useful <em>only</em> for testing. You must change
it for production use.</p>
<h3><a name="securing.secrets">File security</a></h3>
<p>You must deliver this file, or the relevant part of it, to the other
gateway machine by some <strong>secure</strong> means. <em>Don't just FTP or
mail the file!</em> It is vital that the secrets in it remain secret. An
attacker who knew those could easily have <em>all the data on your "secure"
connection</em>.</p>
<p>This file must be owned by root and should have permissions
<var>rw-------</var>.</p>
<h3><a name="notroadshared">Shared secrets for road warriors</a></h3>
<p>You can use a shared secret to support a single road warrior connecting to
your gateway, and this is a reasonable thing to do in some circumstances.
Public key methods have advantages, discussed <a href="#choose">above</a>,
but they are not critical in this case.</p>
<p>To do this, the line in ipsec.secrets(5) is something like:</p>
<pre> 10.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 : PSK "jxTR1lnmSjuj33n4W51uW3kTR55luUmSmnlRUuWnkjRj3UuTV4T3USSu23Uk55nWu5TkTUnjT"</pre>
where the <var>0.0.0.0</var> means that any IP address is acceptable.
<p><strong>For more than one road warrior, shared secrets are <em>not</em>
recommended.</strong> If shared secrets are used, then when the responder
needs to look up the secret, all it knows about the sender is an IP address.
This is fine if the sender is at a fixed IP address specified in the config
file. It is also fine if only one road warrior uses the wildcard
<var>0.0.0.0</var> address. However, if you have more than one road warrior
using shared secret authentication, then they must all use that wildcard and
therefore <strong>all road warriors using PSK autentication must use the same
secret</strong>. Obviously, this is insecure.</p>
<p><strong>For multiple road warriors, use public key
authentication.</strong> Each roadwarrior can then have its own identity (our
<var>leftid=</var> or <var>rightid=</var> parameters), its own public/private
key pair, and its own secure connection.</p>
<h2><a name="prodman">Using manual keying in production</a></h2>
<p>Generally, <a href="glossary.html#auto">automatic keying</a> is preferred
over <a href="glossary.html#manual">manual keying</a> for production use
because it is both easier to manage and more secure. Automatic keying frees
the admin from much of the burden of managing keys securely, and can provide
<a href="glossary.html#PFS">perfect forward secrecy</a>. This is discussed in
more detail <a href="#man-auto">above</a>.</p>
<p>However, it is possible to use manual keying in production if that is what
you want to do. This might be necessary, for example, in order to
interoperate with some device that either does not provide automatic keying
or provides it in some version we cannot talk to.</p>
<p>Note that with manual keying <strong>all security rests with the
keys</strong>. If an adversary acquires your keys, you've had it. He or she
can read everything ever sent with those keys, including old messages he or
she may have archived.</p>
<p>You need to <strong>be really paranoid about keys</strong> if you're going
to rely on manual keying for anything important.</p>
<ul>
<li>keep keys in files with 600 permissions, owned by root</li>
<li>be extremely careful about security of your gateway systems. Anyone who
breaks into a gateway and gains root privileges can get all your keys and
read everything ever encrypted with those keys, both old messages he has
archived and any new ones you may send.</li>
<li>change keys regularly. This can be a considerable bother, (and provides
an excellent reason to consider automatic keying instead), but it is
<em>absolutely essential</em> for security. Consider a manually keyed
system in which you leave the same key in place for months:
<ul>
<li>an attacker can have a very large sample of text sent with that key
to work with. This makes various cryptographic attacks much more
likely to succeed.</li>
<li>The chances of the key being compromised in some non-cryptographic
manner -- a spy finds it on a discarded notepad, someone breaks into
your server or your building and steals it, a staff member is bribed,
tricked, seduced or coerced into revealing it, etc. -- also increase
over time.</li>
<li>a successful attacker can read everything ever sent with that key.
This makes any successful attack extremely damaging.</li>
</ul>
It is clear that you must change keys often to have any useful security.
The only question is how often.</li>
<li>use <a href="glossary.html#PGP">PGP</a> or <a
href="glossary.html#SSH">SSH</a> for all key transfers</li>
<li>don't edit files with keys in them when someone can look over your
shoulder</li>
<li>worry about network security; could someone get keys by snooping
packets on the LAN between your X desktop and the gateway?</li>
<li>lock up your backup tapes for the gateway system</li>
<li>... and so on</li>
</ul>
<p>Linux FreeS/WAN provides some facilities to help with this. In particular,
it is good policy to <strong>keep keys in separate files</strong> so you can
edit configuration information in /etc/ipsec.conf without exposing keys to
"shoulder surfers" or network snoops. We support this with the
<var>also=</var> and <var>include</var> syntax in <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</a>.</p>
<p>See the last example in our <a href="examples">examples</a> file. In the
/etc/ipsec.conf <var>conn samplesep</var> section, it has the line:</p>
<pre> also=samplesep-keys</pre>
<p>which tells the "ipsec manual" script to insert the configuration
description labelled "samplesep-keys" if it can find it. The /etc/ipsec.conf
file must also have a line such as:</p>
<pre>include ipsec.*.conf</pre>
<p>which tells it to read other files. One of those other files then might
contain the additional data:</p>
<pre>conn samplesep-keys
spi=0x200
esp=3des-md5-96
espenckey=0x01234567_89abcdef_02468ace_13579bdf_12345678_9abcdef0
espauthkey=0x12345678_9abcdef0_2468ace0_13579bdf</pre>
<p>The first line matches the label in the "also=" line, so the indented
lines are inserted. The net effect is exactly as if the inserted lines had
occurred in the original file in place of the "also=" line.</p>
<p>Variables set here are:</p>
<dl>
<dt>spi</dt>
<dd>A number needed by the manual keying code. Any 3-digit hex number
will do, but if you have more than one manual connection then
<strong>spi must be different</strong> for each connection.</dd>
<dt>esp</dt>
<dd>Options for <a href="glossary.html#ESP">ESP</a> (Encapsulated
Security Payload), the usual IPsec encryption mode. Settings here are
for <a href="glossary.html#encryption">encryption</a> using <a
href="glossary.html#3DES">triple DES</a> and <a
href="glossary.html#authentication">authentication</a> using <a
href="glossary.html#MD5">MD5</a>. Note that encryption without
authentication should not be used; it is insecure.</dd>
<dt>espenkey</dt>
<dd>Key for ESP encryption. Here, a 192-bit hex number for triple
DES.</dd>
<dt>espauthkey</dt>
<dd>Key for ESP authentication. Here, a 128-bit hex number for MD5.</dd>
</dl>
<p><strong>Note</strong> that the <strong>example keys we supply</strong> are
intended <strong>only for testing</strong>. For real use, you should go to
automatic keying. If that is not possible, create your own keys for manual
mode and keep them secret</p>
<p>Of course, any files containing keys <strong>must</strong> have 600
permissions and be owned by root.</p>
<p>If you connect in this way to multiple sites, we recommend that you keep
keys for each site in a separate file and adopt some naming convention that
lets you pick them all up with a single "include" line. This minimizes the
risk of losing several keys to one error or attack and of accidentally giving
another site admin keys which he or she has no business knowing.</p>
<p>Also note that if you have multiple manually keyed connections on a single
machine, then the <var>spi</var> parameter must be different for each one.
Any 3-digit hex number is OK, provided they are different for each
connection. We reserve the range 0x100 to 0xfff for manual connections. Pluto
assigns SPIs from 0x1000 up for automatically keyed connections.</p>
<p>If <a href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</a> contains keys
for manual mode connections, then it too must have permissions
<var>rw-------</var>. We recommend instead that, if you must manual keying in
production, you keep the keys in separate files.</p>
<p>Note also that <a href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</a> is
installed with permissions <var>rw-r--r--</var>. If you plan to use manually
keyed connections for anything more than initial testing, you <b>must</b>:</p>
<ul>
<li>either change permissions to <var>rw-------</var></li>
<li>or store keys separately in secure files and access them via include
statements in <a href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>We recommend the latter method for all but the simplest configurations.</p>
<h3><a name="ranbits">Creating keys with ranbits</a></h3>
<p>You can create new <a href="glossary.html#random">random</a> keys with the
<a href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html">ranbits(8)</a> utility. For example,
the commands:</p>
<pre> umask 177
ipsec ranbits 192 > temp
ipsec ranbits 128 >> temp</pre>
<p>create keys in the sizes needed for our default algorithms:</p>
<ul>
<li>192-bit key for <a href="glossary.html#3DES">3DES</a> encryption <br>
(only 168 bits are used; parity bits are ignored)</li>
<li>128-bit key for keyed <a href="glossary.html#MD5">MD5</a>
authentication</li>
</ul>
<p>If you want to use <a href="glossary.html#SHA">SHA</a> instead of <a
href="glossary.html#MD5">MD5</a>, that requires a 160-bit key</p>
<p>Note that any <strong>temporary files</strong> used must be kept
<strong>secure</strong> since they contain keys. That is the reason for the
umask command above. The temporary file should be deleted as soon as you are
done with it. You may also want to change the umask back to its default value
after you are finished working on keys.</p>
<p>The ranbits utility may pause for a few seconds if not enough entropy is
available immediately. See ipsec_ranbits(8) and random(4) for details. You
may wish to provide some activity to feed entropy into the system. For
example, you might move the mouse around, type random characters, or do
<var>du /usr > /dev/null</var> in the background.</p>
<h2><a name="boot">Setting up connections at boot time</a></h2>
<p>You can tell the system to set up connections automatically at boot time
by putting suitable stuff in /etc/ipsec.conf on both systems. The relevant
section of the file is labelled by a line reading <var>config setup</var>.</p>
<p>Details can be found in the <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</a> man page. We also
provide a file of <a href="examples">example configurations</a>.</p>
<p>The most likely options are something like:</p>
<dl>
<dt>interfaces="ipsec0=eth0 ipsec1=ppp0"</dt>
<dd>Tells KLIPS which interfaces to use. Up to four interfaces numbered
ipsec[0-3] are supported. Each interface can support an arbitrary
number of tunnels.
<p>Note that for PPP, you give the ppp[0-9] device name here, not the
underlying device such as modem (or eth1 if you are using PPPoE).</p>
</dd>
<dt>interfaces=%defaultroute</dt>
<dd>Alternative setting, useful in simple cases. KLIPS will pick up both
its interface and the next hop information from the settings of the
Linux default route.</dd>
<dt>forwardcontrol=no</dt>
<dd>Normally "no". Set to "yes" if the IP forwarding option is disabled
in your network configuration. (This can be set as a kernel
configuration option or later. e.g. on Redhat, it's in
/etc/sysconfig/network and on SuSE you can adjust it with Yast.) Linux
FreeS/WAN will then enable forwarding when starting up and turn it off
when going down. This is used to ensure that no packets will be
forwarded before IPsec comes up and takes control.</dd>
<dt>syslog=daemon.error</dt>
<dd>Used in messages to the system logging daemon (syslogd) to specify
what type of software is sending the messages. If the settings are
"daemon.error" as in our example, then syslogd treats the messages as
error messages from a daemon.
<p>Note that <a href="glossary.html#Pluto">Pluto</a> does not currently
pay attention to this variable. The variable controls setup messages
only.</p>
</dd>
<dt>klipsdebug=</dt>
<dd>Debug settings for <a href="glossary.html#KLIPS">KLIPS</a>.</dd>
<dt>plutodebug=</dt>
<dd>Debug settings for <a href="glossary.html#Pluto">Pluto</a>.</dd>
<dt>... for both the above DEBUG settings</dt>
<dd>Normally, leave empty as shown above for no debugging output.<br>
Use "all" for maximum information.<br>
See ipsec_klipsdebug(8) and ipsec_pluto(8) man page for other options.
Beware that if you set /etc/ipsec.conf to enable debug output, your
system's log files may get large quickly.</dd>
<dt>dumpdir=/safe/directory</dt>
<dd>Normally, programs started by ipsec setup don't crash. If they do, by
default, no core dump will be produced because such dumps would contain
secrets. If you find you need to debug such crashes, you can set
dumpdir to the name of a directory in which to collect the core
file.</dd>
<dt>manualstart=</dt>
<dd>List of manually keyed connections to be automatically started at
boot time. Useful for testing, but not for long term use. Connections
which are automatically started should also be automatically
re-keyed.</dd>
<dt>pluto=yes</dt>
<dd>Whether to start <a href="glossary.html#Pluto">Pluto</a> when ipsec
startup is done.<br>
This parameter is optional and defaults to "yes" if not present.
<p>"yes" is strongly recommended for production use so that the keying
daemon (Pluto) will automatically re-key the connections regularly. The
ipsec-auto parameters ikelifetime, ipseclifetime and reykeywindow give
you control over frequency of rekeying.</p>
</dd>
<dt>plutoload="reno-van reno-adam reno-nyc"</dt>
<dd>List of tunnels (by name, e.g. fred-susan or reno-van in our
examples) to be loaded into Pluto's internal database at startup. In
this example, Pluto loads three tunnels into its database when it is
started.
<p>If plutoload is "%search", Pluto will load any connections whose
description includes "auto=add" or "auto=start".</p>
</dd>
<dt>plutostart="reno-van reno-adam reno-nyc"</dt>
<dd>List of tunnels to attempt to negotiate when Pluto is started.
<p>If plutostart is "%search", Pluto will start any connections whose
description includes "auto=start".</p>
<p>Note that, for a connection intended to be permanent, <strong>both
gateways should be set try to start</strong> the tunnel. This allows
quick recovery if either gateway is rebooted or has its IPsec
restarted. If only one gateway is set to start the tunnel and the other
gateway restarts, the tunnel may not be rebuilt.</p>
</dd>
<dt>plutowait=no</dt>
<dd>Controls whether Pluto waits for one tunnel to be established before
starting to negotiate the next. You might set this to "yes"
<ul>
<li>if your gateway is a very limited machine and you need to
conserve resources.</li>
<li>for debugging; the logs are clearer if only one connection is
brought up at a time</li>
</ul>
For a busy and resource-laden production gateway, you likely want "no"
so that connections are brought up in parallel and the whole process
takes less time.</dd>
</dl>
<p>The example assumes you are at the Reno office and will use IPsec to
Vancouver, New York City and Amsterdam.</p>
<h2><a name="multitunnel">Multiple tunnels between the same two
gateways</a></h2>
<p>Consider a pair of subnets, each with a security gateway, connected via
the Internet:</p>
<pre> 192.168.100.0/24 left subnet
|
192.168.100.1
North Gateway
101.101.101.101 left
|
101.101.101.1 left next hop
[Internet]
202.202.202.1 right next hop
|
202.202.202.202 right
South gateway
192.168.200.1
|
192.168.200.0/24 right subnet</pre>
<p>A tunnel specification such as:</p>
<pre>conn northnet-southnet
left=101.101.101.101
leftnexthop=101.101.101.1
leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24
leftfirewall=yes
right=202.202.202.202
rightnexthop=202.202.202.1
rightsubnet=192.168.200.0/24
rightfirewall=yes</pre>
will allow machines on the two subnets to talk to each other. You might test
this by pinging from polarbear (192.168.100.7) to penguin (192.168.200.5).
<p>However, <strong>this does not cover other traffic you might want to
secure</strong>. To handle all the possibilities, you might also want these
connection descriptions:</p>
<pre>conn northgate-southnet
left=101.101.101.101
leftnexthop=101.101.101.1
right=202.202.202.202
rightnexthop=202.202.202.1
rightsubnet=192.168.200.0/24
rightfirewall=yes
conn northnet-southgate
left=101.101.101.101
leftnexthop=101.101.101.1
leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24
leftfirewall=yes
right=202.202.202.202
rightnexthop=202.202.202.1</pre>
<p>Without these, neither gateway can do IPsec to the remote subnet. There is
no IPsec tunnel or eroute set up for the traffic.</p>
<p>In our example, with the non-routable 192.168.* addresses used, packets
would simply be discarded. In a different configuration, with routable
addresses for the remote subnet, <strong>they would be sent
unencrypted</strong> since there would be no IPsec eroute and there would be
a normal IP route.</p>
<p>You might also want:</p>
<pre>conn northgate-southgate
left=101.101.101.101
leftnexthop=101.101.101.1
right=202.202.202.202
rightnexthop=202.202.202.1</pre>
<p>This is required if you want the two gateways to speak IPsec to each
other.</p>
<p>This requires a lot of duplication of details. Judicious use of
<var>also=</var> and <var>include</var> can reduce this problem.</p>
<p>Note that, while FreeS/WAN supports all four tunnel types, not all
implementations do. In particular, some versions of Windows 2000 and the
freely downloadable version of PGP provide only "client" functionality. You
cannot use them as gateways with a subnet behind them. To get that
functionality, you must upgrade to Windows 2000 server or the commercially
available PGP products.</p>
<h3><a name="advroute">One tunnel plus advanced routing</a></h3>
It is also possible to use the new routing features in 2.2 and later kernels
to avoid most needs for multple tunnels. Here is one mailing list message on
the topic:
<pre>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: IPSec packets not entering tunnel?
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000
From: Justin Guyett <jfg@sonicity.com>
On Mon, 20 Nov 2000, Claudia Schmeing wrote:
> Right Left
> "home" "office"
> 10.92.10.0/24 ---- 24.93.85.110 ========= 216.175.164.91 ---- 10.91.10.24/24
>
> I've created all four tunnels, and can ping to test each of them,
> *except* homegate-officenet.
I keep wondering why people create all four tunnels. Why not route
traffic generated from home to 10.91.10.24/24 out ipsec0 with iproute2?
And 99% of the time you don't need to access "office" directly, which
means you can eliminate all but the subnet<->subnet connection.</pre>
and FreeS/WAN technical lead Henry Spencer's comment:
<pre>> I keep wondering why people create all four tunnels. Why not route
> traffic generated from home to 10.91.10.24/24 out ipsec0 with iproute2?
This is feasible, given some iproute2 attention to source addresses, but
it isn't something we've documented yet... (partly because we're still
making some attempt to support 2.0.xx kernels, which can't do this, but
mostly because we haven't caught up with it yet).
> And 99% of the time you don't need to access "office" directly, which
> means you can eliminate all but the subnet<->subnet connection.
Correct in principle, but people will keep trying to ping to or from the
gateways during testing, and sometimes they want to run services on the
gateway machines too.</pre>
<!-- Is this in the right spot in this document? -->
<H2><A name="opp.gate">An Opportunistic Gateway</A></H2>
<H3>Start from full opportunism</H3>
<P>Full opportunism
allows you to initiate and receive opportunistic connections on your
machine. The remaining instructions in this section assume
you have first set up full opportunism on your gateway using
<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.incoming">these instructions</A>.
Both sets of instructions require mailing DNS records to your ISP. Collect
DNS records for both the gateway (above) and the
subnet nodes (below) before contacting your ISP.</P>
<H3>Reverse DNS TXT records for each protected machine</H3>
<P>You need these so that your Opportunistic peers can:
<UL>
<LI>discover the gateway's address, knowing only the IP address
that packets are bound for</LI>
<LI>verify that the gateway is authorised to encrypt for that endpoint</LI>
</UL>
<P>On the gateway, generate a TXT record with:
<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --txt 192.0.2.11</PRE>
<P>Use your gateway address in place of 192.0.2.11.</P>
<P>You should see (keys are trimmed for clarity throughout our example):</P>
<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000
IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE>
<P><B>This MUST BE the same key as in your gateway's TXT record, or nothing
will work.</B></P>
<P>In a text file, make one copy of this TXT record for each subnet
node:</P>
<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000
IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"
; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000
IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"
; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000
IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE>
<P>Above each entry, insert a line like this:</P>
<PRE> 98.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR arthur.example.com.</PRE>
<P>It must include:</P>
<UL>
<LI>The subnet node's address in reverse map format. For example, 192.0.2.120
becomes <VAR>120.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.</VAR>. Note the final period.</LI>
<LI><VAR>IN PTR</VAR></LI>
<LI>The node's name, ie. <VAR>arthur.example.com.</VAR>. Note
the final period.</LI>
</UL>
<P>The result will be a file of TXT records, like this:</P>
<PRE> 98.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR arthur.example.com.
; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000
IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"
99.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR ford.example.com.
; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000
IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"
100.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR trillian.example.com.
; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000
IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE>
<H3>Publish your records</H3>
<P>Ask your ISP to publish all the reverse DNS records you have collected.
There may be a delay of up to 48 hours as the records propagate.</P>
<H3>...and test them</H3>
<P>Check a couple of records with commands like this one:</P>
<PRE> ipsec verify --host ford.example.com
ipsec verify --host trillian.example.com</PRE>
<P>The <var>verify</var> command checks for TXT records for both the
subnet host and its gateway. You should see output like:</P>
<PRE> ...
Looking for TXT in reverse map: 99.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK]
...
Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK]
...
Looking for TXT in reverse map: 100.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK]
...
Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK]
...</PRE>
<H3>No Configuration Needed</H3>
<P>FreeS/WAN 2.x ships with a built-in, automatically
enabled OE connection <VAR>conn packetdefault</VAR>
which applies OE, if possible, to all outbound traffic routed
through the FreeS/WAN box.
The
<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5) manual</A>
describes this connection in detail.
While the effect is much the same as <VAR>private-or-clear</VAR>,
the implementation is different: notably, it does not use policy
groups.</P>
<P>You can create more complex OE configurations
for traffic forwarded through a FreeS/WAN box, as explained in our
<A HREF="policygroups.html#policygroups">policy groups document</A>,
or disable OE using
<A HREF="policygroups.html#disable_policygroups">these instructions</A>.</P>
<h2><a name="extruded.config">Extruded Subnets</a></h2>
<p>What we call <a href="glossary.html#extruded">extruded subnets</a> are a
special case of <a href="glossary.html#VPN.gloss">VPNs</a>.</p>
<p>If your buddy has some unused IP addresses, in his subnet far off at the
other side of the Internet, he can loan them to you... provided that the
connection between you and him is fast enough to carry all the traffic
between your machines and the rest of the Internet. In effect, he "extrudes"
a part of his address space over the network to you, with your Internet
traffic appearing to originate from behind his Internet gateway.</p>
<p>As far as the Internet is concerned, your new extruded net is behind your
buddy's gateway. You route all your packets for the Internet at large
out his gateway, and receive return packets the same way. You route your
local packets locally.</p>
<p>Suppose your friend has a.b.c.0/24 and wants to give you a.b.c.240/28. The
initial situation is:</p>
<pre> subnet gateway Internet
a.b.c.0/24 a.b.c.1 p.q.r.s</pre>
where anything from the Internet destined for any machine in a.b.c.0/24 is
routed via p.q.r.s and that gateway knows what to do from there.
<p>Of course it is quite normal for various smaller subnets to exist behind
your friend's gateway. For example, your friend's company might have
a.b.c.16/28=development, a.b.c.32/28=marketing and so on. The Internet
neither knows not cares about this; it just delivers packets to the p.q.r.s
and lets the gateway do whatever needs to be done from there.</p>
<p>What we want to do is take a subnet, perhaps a.b.c.240/28, out of your
friend's physical location <em>while still having your friend's gateway route
to it</em>. As far as the Internet is concerned, you remain behind that
gateway.</p>
<pre> subnet gateway Internet your gate extruded
a.b.c.0/24 a.b.c.1 p.q.r.s d.e.f.g a.b.c.240/28
========== tunnel ==========</pre>
<p>The extruded addresses have to be a complete subnet.</p>
<p>In our example, the friend's security gateway is also his Internet
gateway, but this is not necessary. As long as all traffic from the Internet
to his addresses passes through the Internet gate, the security gate could be
a machine behind that. The IG would need to route all traffic for the
extruded subnet to the SG, and the SG could handle the rest.</p>
<p>First, configure your subnet using the extruded addresses. Your security
gateway's interface to your subnet needs to have an extruded address
(possibly using a Linux <a href="glossary.html#virtual">virtual
interface</a>, if it also has to have a different address). Your gateway
needs to have a route to the extruded subnet, pointing to that interface. The
other machines at your site need to have addresses in that subnet, and
default routes pointing to your gateway.</p>
<p>If any of your friend's machines need to talk to the extruded subnet,
<em>they</em> need to have a route for the extruded subnet, pointing at his
gateway.</p>
<p>Then set up an IPsec subnet-to-subnet tunnel between your gateway and his,
with your subnet specified as the extruded subnet, and his subnet specified
as "0.0.0.0/0".</p>
<p>The tunnel description should be:</p>
<pre>conn extruded
left=p.q.r.s
leftsubnet=0.0.0.0/0
right=d.e.f.g
rightsubnet=a.b.c.0/28</pre>
<p>If either side was doing firewalling for the extruded subnet before the
IPsec connection is set up, you'll need to poke holes in your
<A HREF="firewall.html#firewall">firewall</A> to allow packets through.
</p>
<p>And it all just works. Your SG routes traffic for 0.0.0.0/0 -- that is,
the whole Internet -- through the tunnel to his SG, which then sends it
onward as if it came from his subnet. When traffic for the extruded subnet
arrives at his SG, it gets sent through the tunnel to your SG, which passes
it to the right machine.</p>
<p>Remember that when ipsec_manual or ipsec_auto takes a connection down, it
<em>does not undo the route</em> it made for that connection. This lets you
take a connection down and bring up a new one, or a modified version of the
old one, without having to rebuild the route it uses and without any risk of
packets which should use IPsec accidentally going out in the clear. Because
the route always points into KLIPS, the packets will always go there. Because
KLIPS temporarily has no idea what to do with them (no eroute for them), they
will be discarded.</p>
<p>If you <em>do</em> want to take the route down, this is what the "unroute"
operation in manual and auto is for. Just do an unroute after doing the
down.</p>
<p>Note that the route for a connection may have replaced an existing
non-IPsec route. Nothing in Linux FreeS/WAN will put that pre-IPsec route
back. If you need it back, you have to create it with the route command.</p>
<h2><a name="roadvirt">Road Warrior with virtual IP address</a></h2>
<p>Please note that <A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/download.php">Super
FreeS/WAN</A> now features DHCP-over-IPsec, which is an alternate procedure
for Virtual IP address assignment.
<p>
<p>Here is a mailing list message about another way to configure for road
warrior support:</p>
<pre>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: understanding the vpn
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 1999 10:43:22 -0400
From: Irving Reid <irving@nevex.com>
> local-------linux------internet------mobile
> LAN box user
> ...
> now when the mobile user connects to the linux box
> it is given a virtual IP address, i have configured it to
> be in the 10.x.x.x range. mobile user and linux box
> have a tunnel between them with these IP addresses.
> Uptil this all is fine.
If it is possible to configure your mobile client software *not* to
use a virtual IP address, that will make your life easier. It is easier
to configure FreeS/WAN to use the actual address the mobile user gets
from its ISP.
Unfortunately, some Windows clients don't let you choose.
> what i would like to know is that how does the mobile
> user communicate with other computers on the local
> LAN , of course with the vpn ?
> what IP address should the local LAN
> computers have ? I guess their default gateway
> should be the linux box ? and does the linux box need
> to be a 2 NIC card box or one is fine.
As someone else stated, yes, the Linux box would usually be the default
IP gateway for the local lan.
However...
If you mobile user has software that *must* use a virtual IP address,
the whole picture changes. Nobody has put much effort into getting
FreeS/WAN to play well in this environment, but here's a sketch of one
approach:
Local Lan 1.0.0.0/24
|
+- Linux FreeS/WAN 1.0.0.2
|
| 1.0.0.1
Router
| 2.0.0.1
|
Internet
|
| 3.0.0.1
Mobile User
Virtual Address: 1.0.0.3
Note that the Local Lan network (1.0.0.x) can be registered, routable
addresses.
Now, the Mobile User sets up an IPSec security association with the
Linux box (1.0.0.2); it should ESP encapsulate all traffic to the
network 1.0.0.x **EXCEPT** UDP port 500. 500/udp is required for the key
negotiation, which needs to work outside of the IPSec tunnel.
On the Linux side, there's a bunch of stuff you need to do by hand (for
now). FreeS/WAN should correctly handle setting up the IPSec SA and
routes, but I haven't tested it so this may not work...
The FreeS/WAN conn should look like:
conn mobile
right=1.0.0.2
rightsubnet=1.0.0.0/24
rightnexthop=1.0.0.1
left=0.0.0.0 # The infamous "road warrior"
leftsubnet=1.0.0.3/32
Note that the left subnet contains *only* the remote host's virtual
address.
Hopefully the routing table on the FreeS/WAN box ends up looking like
this:
% netstat -rn
Kernel IP routing table
Destination Gateway Genmask Flags MSS Window irtt Iface
1.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 U 1500 0 0 eth0
127.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 U 3584 0 0 lo
0.0.0.0 1.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 UG 1500 0 0 eth0
1.0.0.3 1.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 UG 1433 0 0 ipsec0
So, if anybody sends a packet for 1.0.0.3 to the Linux box, it should
get bundled up and sent through the tunnel. To get the packets for
1.0.0.3 to the Linux box in the first place, you need to use "proxy
ARP".
How this works is: when a host or router on the local Ethernet segment
wants to send a packet to 1.0.0.3, it sends out an Ethernet level
broadcast "ARP request". If 1.0.0.3 was on the local LAN, it would
reply, saying "send IP packets for 1.0.0.3 to my Ethernet address".
Instead, you need to set up the Linux box so that _it_ answers ARP
requests for 1.0.0.3, even though that isn't its IP address. That
convinces everyone else on the lan to send 1.0.0.3 packets to the Linux
box, where the usual FreeS/WAN processing and routing take over.
% arp -i eth0 -s 1.0.0.3 -D eth0 pub
This says, if you see an ARP request on interface eth0 asking for
1.0.0.3, respond with the Ethernet address of interface eth0.
Now, as I said at the very beginning, if it is *at all* possible to
configure your client *not* to use the virtual IP address, you can avoid
this whole mess.</pre>
<h2><a name="dynamic">Dynamic Network Interfaces</a></h2>
<p>Sometimes you have to cope with a situation where the network interface(s)
aren't all there at boot. The common example is notebooks with PCMCIA.</p>
<h3><a name="basicdyn">Basics</a></h3>
<p>The key issue here is that the <var>config setup</var> section of the
<var>/etc/ipsec.conf</var> configuration file lists the connection between
ipsecN and hardware interfaces, in the <var>interfaces=</var> variable. At
any time when <var>ipsec setup start</var> or <var>ipsec setup restart</var>
is run this variable <strong>must</strong> correspond to the current real
situation. More precisely, it <strong>must not</strong> mention any hardware
interfaces which don't currently exist. The difficulty is that an <var>ipsec
setup start</var> command is normally run at boot time so interfaces that are
not up then are mis-handled.</p>
<h3><a name="bootdyn">Boot Time</a></h3>
<p>Normally, an <var>ipsec setup start</var> is run at boot time. However, if
the hardware situation at boot time is uncertain, one of two things must be
done.</p>
<ul>
<li>One possibility is simply not to have IPsec brought up at boot time. To
do this:
<pre> chkconfig --level 2345 ipsec off</pre>
That's for modern Red Hats or other Linuxes with chkconfig. Systems which
lack this will require fiddling with symlinks in /etc/rc.d/rc?.d or the
equivalent.</li>
<li>Another possibility is to bring IPsec up with no interfaces, which is
less aesthetically satisfying but simpler. Just put
<pre> interfaces=</pre>
in the configuration file. KLIPS and Pluto will be started, but won't do
anything.</li>
</ul>
<h3><a name="changedyn">Change Time</a></h3>
<p>When the hardware *is* in place, IPsec has to be made aware of it. Someday
there may be a nice way to do this.</p>
<p>Right now, the way to do it is to fix the <var>/etc/ipsec.conf</var> file
appropriately, so <var>interfaces</var> reflects the new situation, and then
restart the IPsec subsystem. This does break any existing IPsec
connections.</p>
<p>If IPsec wasn't brought up at boot time, do</p>
<pre> ipsec setup start</pre>
while if it was, do
<pre> ipsec setup restart</pre>
which won't be as quick.
<p>If some of the hardware is to be taken out, before doing that, amend the
configuration file so interfaces no longer includes it, and do</p>
<pre> ipsec setup restart</pre>
<p>Again, this breaks any existing connections.</p>
<h2><a name="unencrypted">Unencrypted tunnels</a></h2>
<p>Sometimes you might want to create a tunnel without encryption. Often this
is a bad idea, even if you have some data which need not be private. See this
<a href="ipsec.html#traffic.resist">discussion</a>.</p>
<p>The IPsec protocols provide two ways to do build such tunnels:</p>
<dl>
<dt>using ESP with null encryption</dt>
<dd>not supported by FreeS/WAN</dd>
<dt>using <a href="glossary.html#AH">AH</a> without <a
href="glossary.html#ESP">ESP</a></dt>
<dd>supported for manually keyed connections</dd>
<dd>possible with explicit commands via <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html">ipsec_whack(8)</a> (see this <a
href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00190.html">list
message</a>)</dd>
<dd>not supported in the <a
href="manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto(8)</a> scripts.</dd>
</dl>
One situation in which this comes up is when otherwise some data would be
encrypted twice. Alice wants a secure tunnel from her machine to Bob's. Since
she's behind one security gateway and he's behind another, part of the tunnel
that they build passes through the tunnel that their site admins have built
between the gateways. All of Alice and Bob's messages are encrypted twice.
<p>There are several ways to handle this.</p>
<ul>
<li>Just accept the overhead of double encryption. The site admins might
choose this if any of the following apply:
<ul>
<li>policy says encrypt everything (usually, it should)</li>
<li>they don't entirely trust Alice and Bob (usually, if they don't
have to, they shouldn't)</li>
<li>if they don't feel the saved cycles are worth the time they'd need
to build a non-encrypted tunnel for Alice and Bob's packets (often,
they aren't)</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Use a plain IP-in-IP tunnel. These are not well documented. A good
starting point is in the Linux kernel source tree, in
/usr/src/linux/drivers/net/README.tunnel.</li>
<li>Use a manually-keyed AH-only tunnel.</li>
</ul>
<p>Note that if Alice and Bob want end-to-end security, they must build a
tunnel end-to-end between their machines or use some other end-to-end tool
such as PGP or SSL that suits their data. The only question is whether the
admins build some special unencrypted tunnel for those already-encrypted
packets.</p>
</body>
</html>
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